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NEBRASK~S LIVE STOCK SANITARY 
COMMISSION AND THE RISE OF 
AMERICAN PROGRESSIVISM 
DAVID LEE AMSTUTZ 
TOWARD A PROGRESSIVE AGE 
In the years after the Civil War, the United 
States experienced tremendous economic 
growth. Entrepreneurs such as John D. Rocke-
feller and Andrew Carnegie built giant cor-
porate businesses that dominated entire 
industries. The practice of vertical integra-
tion-in which a single business controlled all 
aspects of production and marketing-drew 
workers from different areas together under 
the same employers. Moreover, the corpora-
tions conducted interstate commerce, and they 
became powerful enough to drive competitors 
out of business. With their smaller rivals 
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removed, the corporations were free to market 
their goods across the United States. As efforts 
to foster economic prosperity continued into 
the twentieth century, they began to include 
reforms, indicating that private business does 
not have to be incompatible with public wel-
fare. 
Corporate business growth was the natural 
outcome of American liberalism. Liberalism, in 
its nineteenth-century sense, may be defined as 
a retreat from traditional authority. Without a 
king or a strong central government, private 
individuals were left to their own devices. 
Th<: ones who had the means were able to 
assume leading roles in society.l Between the 
American Revolution and the Civil War, dif-
ferent views of American liberalism appeared. 
Thinkers such as Thomas Jefferson vilified 
strong national government as the principal 
threat to liberty. Federalists, and later Whigs, 
took a different view. They believed that gov-
ernment aid to private enterprise, as well as 
internal improvements, would help the United 
States prosper.2 
Both the Jeffersonian and Federalist-Whig 
constructs of liberalism continued to exist after 
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the Civil War. The national government pro-
vided federal lands and assistance to the rail-
roads, but it did little to regulate them.3 That 
task fell to the states, some of which passed 
"Granger laws" to direct railroad operations 
within state borders.4 The Civil War estab-
lished that a state could not leave the Union, 
and it also ended slavery, but the concept of 
states' rights remained valid in many ways. 
By the time Theodore Roosevelt became 
president in 1901, Americans were ready to 
accept a strong national government and a 
powerful executive.s The developments that 
made Roosevelt's administration possible 
occurred in the decades before he took office. 
It was during the late 1800s-the time known 
as the Gilded Age-that the national govern-
ment moved from Federalist-Whig policies to 
actual regulation of business. This tendency 
was a fundamental part of progressivism.6 
At its. heart, progressivism was a compre-
hensive set of reforms that helped the United 
States adapt to change~ that occurred during 
the Gilded Age. People expected government 
to address issues of urban growth, overcrowd-
ing, labor unrest, and the domination of the 
economy by corporations.7 Although the fed-
eral government began to regulate businesses, 
progressivism was not a repudiation of capital-
ism or the free market. Progressives shared the 
goal of economic growth with the Federalists 
and the Whigs, and the government only mod-
ified its tactics because America's situation had 
changed. During the nineteenth century, busi-
nesses needed state and federal aid to expand. 
Once the giant corporations formed, it became 
necessary to regulate them to preserve the free 
market.s 
Progressivism, it must be remembered, dif-
fered from Populism. The Populist Party of the 
1890s shared some of the progressives' goals, 
but the Populists envisioned far more gov-
ernment involvement in the economy. They 
advocated federal ownership of railroads and 
communications,9 and they also proposed a 
subtreasury. This plan called for the govern-
ment to loan farmers money and keep surplus 
crops as collateral. Because the crops were to be 
stored in government-owned warehouses, the 
idea resembled collectivized agriculture'!o The 
Populists made some efforts to embrace indus-
trial laborers, but the party's main constituents 
were small farmers from the Great Plains, 
West, and South.!1 While the Populist Party 
collapsed after the presidential election of 
1896,12 progressivism was just getting started. 
Progressive tendencies began in the 1880s, and 
the movement emerged full-blown during the 
administration of Theodore RooseveltP 
The state of Nebraska contributed to pro-
gressive thought in the 1880s. Like the other 
states in the Great Plains, Nebraska was heav-
ily involved in the livestock industry. When 
contagious diseases threatened Nebraska's live-
stock, the state advocated a Federalist-Whig 
policy by requesting federal assistance. The 
national government's powers were limited, 
however, and Nebraska took action by creat-
ing an agency called the Live Stock Sanitary 
Commission. In 1888 Nebraska began calling 
for federal regulation of the large-scale meat-
packing industries in Chicago. These parallel 
impulses for assistance and regulation served 
the same objective, that of helping Nebraska's 
livestock interests. Progressive regulation 
of business was only another stage of the 
Federalist-Whig effort to foster prosperity. 
In its call for protection and regulation, 
Nebraska sought to expand the federal gov-
ernment's powers. The Live Stock Sanitary 
Commission's efforts demonstrate the difficulty 
of coordinating interstate trade, and Nebraska 
would gladly have relinquished some of its 
autonomy in exchange for federal interven-
tion. In time, the hopes of Nebraska's livestock 
interests were realized, and the federal govern-
ment assumed greater responsibility for the 
livestock industry. This involvement led to 
the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 which was an 
important progressive reform. 
GROWTH OF THE LIVESTOCK INDUSTRY 
The Great Plains cattle trade, which was 
vital to Nebraska's economy, began in Texas. 
Spaniards introduced cattle to the region in 
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FIG. 1. Cattle magnate Alexander Hamilton Swan. 
(Photograph RG1085-71-01. Used by permission of 
the Nebraska State Historical Society. 
the eighteenth century, and their numbers 
reached 5 million by 1865. Although herds-
men sold cattle in New Orleans and the Ohio 
Valley during the antebellum era, Texans 
did not begin marketing beeves to the North 
in large numbers until after the Civil War. 
Joseph G. McCoy completed the first success-
ful cattle drive in 1867 when he brought a 
herd to Abilene, Kansas. Towns further west, 
including Newton, Ellsworth, and Dodge City, 
became focal points of the beef trade as other 
drovers followed McCoy's example. Cattlemen 
found that their herds grazed successfully on 
the Northern Plains, and cattle began appear-
ing throughout Colorado, Wyoming, Montana, 
Kansas, Nebraska, and the Dakotas. The 
number of beeves in Nebraska jumped from 
37,000 in 1860 to 1.1 million in 1880.14 
The railroads encouraged the growth of the 
livestock trade. The packing industry devel-
oped during the Civil War because the Union 
Army relied on meat, and railroad companies 
opened numerous stockyards around Chicago. 
FIG. 2. William A. Paxton served as president of 
Union Stock Yards Company of Omaha from 1883 
until 1884, and from 1894 until 1907. (Photograph 
RG1085-71-02. Used by permission of the Nebraska 
State Historical Society.) 
These businesses merged to form the Chicago 
Union Stock Yard and Transit Company in 
1865. With the war's end, the railroads began 
carrying beeves from key points on the Plains 
to markets farther east. Refrigerated cars 
made it possible to slaughter livestock on the 
Plains and ship dressed meat to major com-
panies, such as those operated by Gustavus 
Swift, Philip D. Armour, Nelson Morris, and 
George H. Hammond. New packing centers 
opened in Cincinnati, Milwaukee, St. Louis, 
Omaha, Kansas City, Oklahoma City, and Fort 
Worth.15 
Omaha entered the packing industry in 
1883. Alexander Hamilton Swan, a cattle 
magnate from Wyoming, convinced William 
A. Paxton to move the Transfer Stock Yards 
of Council Bluffs, Iowa, to Nebraska. Swan, 
Paxton, and Colin J. Mackenzie created the 
South Omaha Land Syndicate, which took 
responsibility for establishing the new stock-
yard and building a residential area for work-
ers. A group of investors, including Swan and 
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FIG. 3. John A. McShane served as president of 
Union Stock Yards Company of Omaha from 1884 
until 1894. (Photograph °RG1085·71·03. Used 
by permission of the Nebraska State Historical 
Society.) 
John A. McShane, also formed the Union 
Stock Yards Company of Omaha.16 
McShane became president of this company 
in 1884. Intent on building Omaha's economic 
fortunes, he invited major meatpackers to 
begin operations at the Union Stock Yards. 
George H. Hammond and Company leased a 
plant in Omaha, and by 1885 this enterprise 
was butchering an average of 500 cattle and 
1,000 hogs each day. The Union Stock Yards 
also built a packinghouse for a Chicago firm 
called Fowler Brothers. Thomas J. Lipton 
opened a plant in 1887, which Michael and 
Edward Cudahy assumed in conjunction with 
Philip D. Armour. Union Stock Yards offered 
Gustavus Swift eleven acres of land and 
$135,000 to erect a packinghouse in Omaha. 
He did so in 1888.17 
The federal government took an interest in 
the livestock industry, although the govern-
ment assumed relatively few new powers. In 
1884 President Chester A. Arthur signed an 
act that created the Bureau of Animal Industry 
(BAl) within the Department of Agriculture. 
This agency was responsible for investigating 
animal diseases and preventing the export of 
diseased livestock.18 Since the 1860s the ter-
ritories and states of the Plains had dealt with 
diseases such as pleuropneumonia, Texas fever, 
and hog cholera, typically by enacting quar-
antines.19 The act that created the BAI was 
careful not to infringe upon state laws. It said: 
Whenever the plans and methods of the 
Commissioner of Agriculture shall be 
accepted by any State or Territory in which 
pleuro-pneumonia, or other contagious, 
infectious, or communicable disease is 
declared to exist, or such State or Territory 
shall have adopted plans and methods for 
the suppression and extirpation of said 
diseases, and such plans and methods 
shall be accepted by the Commissioner of 
Agriculture, and whenever the governor of a 
State or other properly constituted authori-
ties signify their readiness to cooperate for 
the extinction of any contagious, infectious, 
or communicable disease in conformity with 
the provisions of this act, the Commissioner 
of Agriculture is hereby authorized to 
expend so much of the money appropri-
ated by this act as may be necessary in such 
investigations, and in such disinfection and 
quarantine measures as may be necessary to 
prevent the spread of the disease from one 
State or Territory into another.20 
The BAI concentrated on researching dis-
eases rather than preventing interstate trade 
in diseased animals.21 The National Cattle 
Growers' Association lobbied for greater gov-
ernment involvement. In addition to giving 
the BAI more sweeping powers, the association 
maintained that the president of the United 
States should regulate the domestic trade of 
animals. Nebraska's legislature supported these 
measures with a resolution that Republican 
senator Charles F. Manderson presented to 
Congress.22 As Nebraskans sought to expand 
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FIG. 4. Charles F. Manderson served in the u.s. 
Senate from 1883 until 1894 and as president of Union 
Stock Yards Company of Omaha in 1907. (Photograph 
RG1085-71-04. Used by permission of the Nebraska 
State Historical Society.) 
the federal government's powers, they relied on 
their state government to meet their immedi-
ate needs. Close relationships between state 
governments and corporate businesses did 
not appear on the Plains as they did in the 
Northeast,23 but Nebraskans favored an active 
state government as a stopgap measure in pro-
tecting their interests. 
CREATION OF THE LIVE STOCK SANITARY 
COMMISSION 
To control the spread of disease in livestock, 
Nebraska appointed a state veterinarian and a 
Live Stock Sanitary Commission. The gover-
nor appointed the veterinarian with the advice 
and consent of Nebraska's senate, and he also 
appointed the livestock commissioners. The 
veterinarian investigated all claims of animal 
disease in the state, while the commission set 
policy. Consisting of three members who were 
engaged in livestock production, this body 
could request the governor to proclaim quar-
antines against other states. It also oversaw 
the confiscation and destruction of animals 
believed to be contagious. The commissioners 
determined how to dispose of these animals 
and also set rates of reimbursement for the 
owners.24 
The bill that provided for the state veterinar-
ian and the Live Stock Sanitary Commission 
passed both houses of the Nebraska legislature 
with little difficulty, although the act did not 
win the two-thirds majority necessary for 
it to take effect immediately. In the state's 
House of Representatives, 49 Republicans 
and 10 Democrats (a total of 59 votes) sup-
ported the bill, while 25 Republicans, eight 
Democrats, one Anti-Monopoly Democtat, and 
one Independent (a total of 35 votes) opposed 
it.25 In the Senate, 20 Republicans and six 
Democrats (a total of 26 votes) supported the 
bill, while five Republicans opposed it.26 
Republican governor James William Dawes 
approved the act on March 5, 1885, but it did 
not go into effect until June 5. In the mean-
time, western states struggled to contain pleuro-
pneumonia in cattle, glanders in horses, and 
cholera in hogs. Many individuals waited anx-
iously for Dawes to take action. H. N. Taylor, 
an agent of the BAI in Denver, Colorado, 
wrote to the Nebraska governor. Taylor told 
Dawes that Colorado's state sanitary board 
had established a quarantine against all cattle 
from Missouri, Illinois, Kentucky, Ohio, 
Pen.nsylvania, West Virginia, New Jersey, 
New York, Delaware, Connecticut, Maryland, 
Virginia, and Washington, DC. Colorado was 
also planning to quarantine against Nebraska 
unless it proclaimed its own restrictions against 
cattle from these states.27 
John A. McShane, who was a Democratic 
member of Nebraska's senate as well as presi-
dent of the Union Stock Yards Company,28 for-
warded a message to Dawes from the Wyoming 
Stock Growers' Association. McShane noted 
that the association represented the owners of 
approximately 1.8 million cattle, valued at over 
$100 million. People living in Nebraska owned 
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FIG. 5. Governor James William Dawes. (Photo-
graph RG3859-01. Used. by permission of the 
Nebraska State Historical Society.) 
about 400,000 of these cattle. According to 
McShane, an epidemic of disease in western 
Nebraska would "ruin one of the greatest 
industries in America." He stressed the need 
for a well-experienced veterinarian.29 
The Wyoming Stock Growers' Association 
expressed tremendous "gratification" with 
Nebraska's new law. The association's execu-
tive committee maintained that such acts were 
a grave necessity. The association advised the 
Nebraska governor, providing details about 
quarantine yards that had been constructed 
in Cheyenne, Wyoming. Also, the association 
noted that there had been recent outbreaks 
of pleuropneumonia in Calloway County, 
Missouri, and Peoria, Illinois. The message 
concluded with a resolution imploring Dawes 
to appoint a state veterinarian and a live-
stock commission as soon as possible.3o In the 
absence of cohesive federal regulation, the 
western states urged cooperation among them-
selves. The BAI was eager to stay informed 
about such activities. The agency contacted 
the Nebraska governor and asked for a copy of 
the new law. J. M. Hoffman, Dawes's private 
secretary, readily complied.3l 
Governor Dawes appointed the livestock 
commissioners as soon as the law took effect. 
The individuals he selected were George W. 
Barnhart of Cheyenne County, J. C. Birney 
of Saline County, and Daniel D. Johnson 
of Cass County.32 The Live Sstock Sanitary 
Commission held an organizational meeting 
on June 24, 1885, with John A. McShane also 
attending.33 The search for a state veterinar-
ian became complicated for several reasons. 
At McShane's urging, Dawes offered the posi-
tion to Dr. Daniel E. Salmon, who was the 
chief of the BAP4 This situation indicates 
the attitudes that existed toward government. 
Dawes and McShane assumed that Salmon 
would choose to leave a federal position for a 
state one. When the chief of the BAI declined, 
Dawes contacted Norman J. Colman, the U.S. 
commissioner of agriculture, and asked about 
possible nominees.35 
Another matter had to be settled before 
a state veterinarian could be appointed. 
Nebraska's legislature had failed to provide for 
the veterinarian's salary in the state's budget. 
When private lenders agreed to advance funds, 
Dawes selected Dr. Julius Gerth Jr.36 Gerth was 
an agent of the BAI who was investigating hog 
cholera in Nebraska. He possessed a degree 
in veterinary science and was highly qualified. 
According to the terms of Nebraska's law, Gerth 
was to cooperate with the Live Stock Sanitary 
Commission and advise the commissioners.37 
FOCUSING ON INTERSTATE TRADE 
The commission took up the matter of a 
pleuropneumonia quarantine in earnest. On 
July 16, 1885, the commissioners requested 
Governor Dawes to prohibit the importation 
of cattle from Connecticut, New York, New 
Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, West 
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Virginia, Ohio, Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, 
Missouri, and Washington, DC. Dawes com-
plied. The governor issued a proclamation 
saying that cattle from these states could only 
enter Nebraska with the permission of the Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission. Points of entry 
were limited to Omaha, Plattsmouth, Blair, 
and Falls City.38 
According to the commission's rules, all 
cattle from the specified states had to be 
quarantined at a point of entry for at least ten 
days. The cattle had to receive bills of health 
from Nebraska's state veterinarian or another 
authorized inspector. Owners had to furnish 
proof that their cattle were free from disease, 
that is, a certificate of health from the state 
of origin and affidavits from two "disinter-
ested parties." Cattle that did not meet these 
requirements were held at the owners' expense. 
Moreover, no railroad could ship cattle from 
the quarantine states into Nebraska.39 Both 
the Union Pacific Railroad and the Baltimore 
and Maryland Railroad accepted these condi-
tions. Railroad officials in Omaha wrote to 
George W. Barnhart, asking for copies of the 
commission's rules.4o 
J. B. Dinsmore, president of Nebraska's State 
Board of Agriculture, recognized the potential 
of the quarantine to create tensions with other 
states. Dinsmore wrote to Dawes, arguing 
that the ten-day waiting requirement would 
keep many animals out of Nebraska and work 
to the detriment of the state fair. Dinsmore 
maintained that a certificate of health would 
be sufficient to prevent the spread of disease.41 
Daniel Wheeler, secretary of the Omaha Fair 
Association, echoed these sentiments. He 
insisted that the governor's proclamation was 
"too sweeping and general in its character."42 
Dawes responded, saying that he was only car-
rying out the wishes of the Live Stock Sanitary 
Commission. The governor showed a certain 
amount of flexibility by saying that the cattle 
would not have to be detained for ten days 
if they received a clean bill of health from a 
Nebraska inspector. Still, Dawes determined 
to enforce the rules of the Live Stock Sanitary 
Commission.43 
Other states began to protest Nebraska's 
policy. On September 5, 1885, Governor 
George Hoadly of Ohio wrote to Dawes. 
Hoadly claimed that Ohio's Board of Live 
Stock Commissioners had conducted a "careful 
examination" of cattle throughout the state, 
and that pleuropneumonia no longer existed 
in Ohio. The Ohio governor asked Dawes to 
lift Nebraska's quarantine.44 Paul Paquin, the 
state veterinarian of Missouri, also requested 
a repeal of the quarantine restrictions. He told 
Dawes that BAl inspectors had found no trace 
of pleuropneumonia in Calloway County since 
Apri1.45 
Dawes referred these communications to 
Gerth. The state veterinarian responded, 
saying that he could not justify repealing the 
quarantine for either Missouri or Ohio. The 
Live Stock Sanitary Commission did not con-
sider a state to be safe until it had been free of 
disease for a year. Paquin admitted that pleuro-
pneumonia had existed in Missouri six months 
ago, and Hoadly made no mention of how long 
Ohio had been clean. Moreover, neither of 
these governors explained the measures they 
were taking to keep disease out of their states.46 
Paquin denounced Gerth's decision in a bitter 
letter to Dawes. The Missouri veterinarian 
reiterated that there had been no pleuropneu-
monia in Calloway County for six months. He 
described the quarantine as a "great detriment 
to both states" and expressed hope that Dawes 
would remove the restrictions before long.47 
More controversy developed when Gover-
nor R. J. Oglesby of Illinois wrote to Dawes. 
A circular from the Live Stock Sanitary 
C.ommission of Illinois found three chronic 
cases of pleuropneumonia in the state, but 
Oglesby suggested easing the quarantine 
restrictions for certain counties in Illinois.48 
Gerth denied this request. Because disease still 
existed in Illinois, the Nebraska veterinarian 
claimed that he would be remiss in his duties 
if he recommended raising the quarantine.49 
These disputes were inevitable. Because states 
were responsible for regulating the livestock 
trade, it was virtually impossible to coordinate 
a uniform trade policy across the nation. Each 
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state acted in its own interest, and this impulse 
brought states into conflict with one another. 
The Live Stock Sanitary Commission did 
its best to encourage trade and maintain good 
relations with other states. On January 9, 1886, 
the commission drafted a resolution saying 
that pleuropneumonia no longer existed in 
some of the states subject to the quarantine. 
Accordingly, the commission requested that 
Dawes repeal his initial set of restrictions and 
issue a new quarantine against Pennsylvania, 
Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, Delaware, 
Maryland, Virginia, West Virginia, Kentucky, 
Tennessee, and Washington, DC. The gover-
nor did so two days later.5o 
DISEASE AND QUARANTINES 
Concern about Texas fever caused the Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission to take further 
action. This disease, also called "splenic fever," 
was common in cattle from the southern states. 
On March 2, 1886, the commission requested 
Dawes to proclaim a quarantine against cattle 
shipped all or part way from Texas, Arkansas, 
Louisiana, Alabama, Mississippi, Florida, 
Georgia, Tennessee, North Carolina, and 
South Carolina. These restrictions were to 
be effective during the months of April, May, 
June, July, August, September, and October. 
Dawes granted the request on March 18.51 
The governor made another modification on 
September 28, 1886. Pleuropneumonia had 
reappeared in Illinois, and Dawes put this state 
back on the quarantine list.52 
States continued to protest Nebraska's 
restrictions. Although the governor of Texas 
accepted Nebraska's rules,53 Governor Henry 
B. Harrison of Connecticut and Governor 
J. Proctor Knott of Kentucky requested that 
the quarantine be lifted.54 William B. Bate, 
the governor of Tennessee, did likewise. The 
Tennessee executive claimed that only nine 
cattle in his state had pleuropneumonia, and 
they belonged to a man named F. B. Hamilton 
who lived in Madison County. According to 
Bate, Tennessee's livestock commissioners, a 
BAI inspector named W. H. Wray, and Daniel 
E. Salmon himself, had inspected the cattle. 
These individuals, along with Tennessee 
commissioner of agriculture A. J. McWhirter, 
agreed that the diseased cattle were not conta-
gious because they had the chronic form of the 
disease. Bate had already requested the state of 
Kansas to remove its quarantine, and now the 
Tennessee governor requested Nebraska to do 
the same.55 
GRADUAL FEDERAL GROWTH 
As the states discussed quarantine restric-
tions, Nebraska encouraged the expansion of 
the BAl's activities. Congress had appropriated 
$100,000 for the BAI in 1885, authorizing the 
commissioner of agriculture to use as much of 
this fund as was necessary to prevent the spread 
of pleuropneumonia. 56 In the spring of 1886, 
Congress considered giving further responsi-
bilities to the BAl. Dawes and Gerth inquired 
if the proposed amendments addressed the 
issue of hog cholera. F. G. Nesbit, the acting 
commissioner of the u.S. Department of 
Agriculture, informed Gerth that the measures 
under consideration only applied to pleuro-
pneumonia. 57 
Governor Dawes presented the matter to 
Congress. In a letter to Senator Charles F. 
Manderson, the governor insisted that the 
BAI take action against hog cholera. The 
disease had "worked incalculable damage to 
the farmers" of Nebraska, and Manderson was 
to request additional provisions.58 Dawes also 
sent this message to congressional represen-
tative James S. Laird.59 Congress paid little 
attention. The federal government empow-
ered the BAI in some ways, saying that the 
agency could purchase and destroy diseased 
animals to "prevent the spread of pleuropneu-
monia from one state into another." The new 
statute was completely silent about the subject 
of hog cholera.60 
Nebraska's state veterinarian and Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission made their first 
biennial report to the governor on December 
1, 1886. The commission concluded that their 
work, "although limited, has been a success." 
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The agency had responded to over 1,200 
communications regarding animal diseases, 
and Nebraska was free of pleuropneumonia.61 
While the quarantine had greatly reduced the 
risk of introducing the disease, Nebraska was 
not absolutely safe. The commissioners main-
tained that 
no state that has so far escaped this worst 
of all calamities to the cattle industry can 
feel safe until Congress has enacted a law 
regulating the movement of all diseased, 
suspected, or exposed cattle within an 
infected district, and prohibiting the move-
ment of all cattle out of said district, except 
on permit issued by a United States govern-
ment inspector, until contagious pleuro-
pneumonia has been stamped out, and the 
district declared free. When this is done, 
every state can and will remove the present 
obstructions so embarrassing to the cattle 
traffic, arising from the vexatious local quar-
antines proclaimed by different states.62 
At this time, the two main threats to 
livestock were glanders in horses and cholera 
in hogs. For the former, state authorities had 
brought about the destruction of 309 horses 
and mules. Of these animals, 211 had been 
killed by order of the commission, and the 
rest were killed voluntarily by their owners. 
At the time of the report, the commission had 
received 426 letters requesting examination 
of horses. Of these complaints, 166 had not 
been answered because of time constraints. 
The commissioners described this situation as 
deplorable, saying, 
we would most earnestly recommend that 
the law be amended to enable the Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission, upon recom-
mendation of the state veterinarian, to 
employ and secure such expert assistance as 
may from time to time be required, the assis-
tants to be known as deputy state veterinar-
ians, and to be clothed with such powers 
as may be necessary for the performance of 
their duties.63 
The commission recommended reimbursing 
the owner of each destroyed horse or mule at 
two-thirds of the animal's appraised worth.64 
Hog cholera was an even greater danger. 
Although the disease was not as prevalent as 
it had been in 1884 and 1885, it still existed 
in every Nebraska county. Cholera. threat-
ened a "large percentage" of Nebraska's $80 
million livestock interest and also damaged 
the economy in other ways. The committee 
estimated that the Union Pacific Railroad and 
the Baltimore and Maryland Railroad each 
lost $25,000 because fewer hogs were being 
shipped.65 To cope with the problem, Gerth 
recommended the killing and cremating of 
every infected animal. The state veterinarian 
also advocated the inspection of each animal 
to be slaughtered, strict enforcement of quaran-
tines, and compulsory disinfection of all places 
having contact with disease.66 
In summary, the commission envisioned 
a more active role for both state and federal 
government. Certainly these measures were 
intended to facilitate commerce and capital-
ism, but they also addressed the public interest 
by promoting sanitation. The commission's 
report noted that three Nebraskans had died of 
glanders in the past year.67 
CONTINUED STATE ACTION 
In 1887 Nebraska's legislature reorganized 
the Live Stock Sanitary Commission into 
a "Board of Live Stock Agents." This body 
cooperated with the state veterinarian and 
functioned in the same manner as the com-
m'ission, but the legislature provided more 
detailed procedures for inspections, reimburse-
ment for destroyed animals, disinfection, and 
penalties. Cooperation with the BAI and the 
U.S. Department of Agriculture were essential 
features of the new act. The law stated that 
the livestock agents be authorized and 
directed to co-operate with the commis-
sioner of agriculture of the United States, or 
any officer or authority of the general gov-
ernment in the suppression and extirpation 
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FIG. 6. Governor John M. Thayer. (Photograph 
RG2720-04. Used by permission of the Nebraska 
State Historical Society.) 
of any and all contagious diseases among 
domestic animals, and in the enforce-
ment and execution of any and all acts 
of Congress to prevent the importation 
or exportation of diseased cattle, and the 
spread of infection or contagious diseases 
among domestic animals.68 
The livestock agents continued to adapt 
Nebraska's quarantine restrictions. Between 
1888 and 1891 the agents asked Governor 
John M. Thayer to issue proclamations on 
seven separate occasions. The agents usually 
specified certain counties, rather than entire 
states.69 Although Nebraska's legislature modi-
fied the offices of the state veterinarian and the 
livestock agents periodically, these positions 
became permanent fixtures in the state's gov-
ernmental bureaucracy,7o 
The BAI cooperated with state agencies as 
its powers slowly expanded. In 1888 Congress 
appropriated $15,000 to help the BAr conduct 
research on hog cholera,7l Nebraska's livestock 
agents also investigated the disease. Despite 
professional differences between Dr. Gerth 
and Frank S. Billings, a researcher at the 
University of Nebraska, these efforts did much 
to advance the germ theory of disease.72 The 
BAI retained the authority to purchase and 
destroy cattle infected with pleuropneumonia, 
and the livestock agents exercised this power 
in regard to horses with glanders. Between 
December 1, 1886, and November 30, 1888, 
the agents destroyed 830 horses and mules. 
Reimbursement costs for Nebraska totaled 
$36,071.50,73 
REQUESTING REGULATION 
As Nebraskans advocated federal action 
on the issue of disease, they also called for 
regulation of the livestock industry. Senator 
Charles F. Manderson supported a resolu-
tion to investigate the packing companies in 
Chicago. The resolution, presented to the U.S. 
Senate by George Vest of Missouri on May 16, 
1888, was a response to falling cattle prices. It 
proposed a committee to determine whether 
Chicago packers were dominating the beef 
trade unfairly.74 The federal government had 
begun efforts to regulate the railroads with the 
Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, and Vest's 
resolution applied the idea to meatpacking,75 
Manderson hurried to praise Vest's resolu-
tion, saying that "immense firms" seemed 
to control the nation's beef industry. The 
Nebraska senator noted the numbers of beeves 
that the Chicago packers had butchered in 
1887: 
Company 
Morris 
Swift 
Armour 
Hammond 
Libby, McNeil and Libby 
Total 
Beeves 
432,507 
557,468 
477,000 
210,320 
126,112 
1,803,407 
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FIG. 7. A scene from the Union Stock Yards Company of Omaha in 1894. (Detail from photograph RG2341-757. 
Used by permission of the Nebraska State Historical Society.) 
Given these figures, Manderson claimed 
if the natural order of things were permitted 
to obtain in this cattle trade, there would 
have been in the last two or three years and 
there would be in the future a very great 
decrease in the number of cattle killed and 
sold in the markets of Chicago to the advan-
tage of the far western communities. 
Even though the Union Stock Yards Com-
pany was trying to attract large-scale investors 
at this time, Manderson leveled accusations at 
the packers in Chicago. He maintained that 
it is something artificial and objectionable 
that continues to maintain Chicago as the 
great cattle market of this country. It is 
true that Kansas City now stands second 
and Omaha third in this great industry, 
and with good chances for great increase 
to both. 
The senator admitted that cattle exports had 
decreased, but he noted that the prices of meat 
products had not fallen accordingly.?6 In truth, 
the price of range cattle had fallen because 
of the demand for higher-quality beef, which 
came from corn-fed cattle. Manderson and 
Vest blamed the situation on big business, how-
ever, and the Senate listened to their concerns. 
It passed Vest's resolution for an investigative 
committee.77 
The committee, which consisted of Vest, 
Manderson, P. B. Plumb of Kansas, Richard 
Coke of Texas, and S. M. Cullom of Illinois, 
conducted its investigation over the next two 
years.78 It presented its final report to Congress 
on May 1, 1890. The investigation indicated 
that the packers had been pooling, or coop-
erating among themselves, to set levels of 
production. The bill that became the Sherman 
Antitrust Act was under debate at the time, 
however, and the committee members assumed 
that this law would provide necessary regula-
tion.?9 
In the meantime, the committee recom-
mended extending the cattle trade to Great 
Britain. Britain had quarantined American 
beeves, and the committee urged federal 
action in regard to the matter. They wanted 
the president to begin diplomatic relations 
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FIG. 8. The original Union Stock Yards Company exchange building. (Detail from photograph RG2341-757b. 
Used by permission of the Nebraska State Historical Society.) 
aimed at modifying the quarantine, and they 
also advocated a meat inspection act to calm 
British fears about unsafe cattle. The commit-
tee requested federal regulation of business in 
two other ways: prohibiting the "monopoly" 
of steamships that carried cattle to other 
countries and preventing discrimination by 
railroads that favored the large packers.8o 
A meat inspection bill had been under 
debate in Congress at the time of the Vest 
committee's report.8! This act became law on 
August 30, 1890. It empowered the Department 
of Agriculture to inspect pork products bound 
for export, with the inspections occurring 
at the places in which the meat was packed. 
In the event that such an inspection was 
not made, the secretary of agriculture could 
approve inspection at the place of export a-
tion.82 Congress provided for similar inspec-
tion of beeves with an act approved on March 
3, 1891. This law also called for inspection of 
all hogs, cattle, and sheep intended for inter-
state commerce before slaughter. 83 
These acts set a precedent for federal regu-
lation of business. The inspections for which 
the laws provided were voluntary,84 and yet a 
company that did not agree to inspection could 
not mark its products with a federal stamp. At 
a time when foreign countries refused to buy 
American meat because they worried about 
contamination, the ability to deny a seal of 
inspection was a considerable power. The BAI 
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FIG. 9. Inspectors at Swift and Company in Omaha shortly after the Meat Inspection Act of 1906 took effect. 
(Photograph RG2341-909. Used by permission of the Nebraska State Historical Society.) 
received increased funds so it could assist with 
the inspections, as well as purchase and destroy 
animals infected with contagious diseases.8s All 
these developments expanded the Department 
of Agriculture, which gained Cabinet status in 
1889.86 The growing . bureaucracy pursued the 
same goal as Nebraska's Board of Live Stock 
Agents, that of helping Nebraska's livestock 
producers prosper. 
Rumblings against the "beef trust" in 
Chicago continued throughout the 1890s. By 
1902 the prices of beef products had risen, and 
consumers made numerous complaints against 
the packing industry. The Justice Department 
responded by launching an investigation. 
Rather than wait for the courts to rule on their 
cooperative pooling practices, Swift, Armour, 
Morris, and Hammond decided to merge their 
holdings into an entity called the National 
Packing Company. 
Peter S. Grosscup, judge of the Circuit Court 
for the Northern District of Illinois, looked to 
the Sherman Antitrust Act for ways to restrict 
the packers. He interpreted the Sherman Act, 
which had become law on July 2, 1890, as a 
guarantee of free competition in the market-
place. An injunction that Grosscup handed 
down on February 25, 1903, prohibited the 
packers from activities that would undermine 
competition. However, the judge added that 
it was permissible to curtail shipments of meat 
to certain areas to prevent overproduction. 
Thus, the packers retained a degree of freedom 
to coordinate their production efforts. The 
Supreme Court further limited the injunction 
in 1905, ruling that only acts specifically men-
tioned in Grosscup's ruling were prohibited.87 
Not one to accept defeat easily, President 
Theodore Roosevelt undertook new efforts to 
regulate the packing companies. He ordered 
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FIG. 10. Team of federal meat inspectors assigned to the Cudahy Packing Company in Omaha, January 1, 1910. 
(Photograph RG2341-909. Used by permission of the Nebraska State Historical Society.) 
the Department of Agriculture to investigate 
inspection practices in Chicago. The depart-
ment's report, completed on April 15, 1906, 
found inadequacies in the current system but 
noted that the dismal conditions described 
in Upton Sinclair's novel The Jungle were 
"greatly exaggerated." Undaunted, Roosevelt 
began cooperating with Indiana senator Albert 
Beveridge to draft a stricter law for meat 
inspection.88 The pair gained much support 
from progressive reformers, including women's 
groups who perceived inspection as a moral 
cause.89 
Although great debate ensued about the 
nature of this law, the packers were not nec-
essarily opposed to inspection. Jonathan O. 
Armour admitted that trying to market non in-
spected meat would be financially "suicidal."90 
The House of Representatives and the Senate 
ultimately reached a compromise on the issue. 
The federal government required inspection of 
all meat products destined for international or 
interstate commerce, and yet the Department 
of Agriculture was to pay for the inspections. 
These terms were included in the 1906 appro-
priations act for the Department of Agriculture, 
which is commonly called the Meat Inspection 
Act. The law stipulated that federal funding 
for inspections would be permanent, and the 
act appropriated $3 million for such purposes 
in 1906.91 
By regulating the packing industry, progres-
sives tried to protect the free-market economy. 
A traditional view is that the packers manipu-
lated the government to assure their domi-
nance,92 but it is more accurate ro say that the 
goals of American liberalism remained as they 
had been under the policies of the Federalists 
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and the Whigs. In some instances, government 
helped businesses, and in others, it tried to 
preserve competition and protect consumers, 
but its objective was always the promotion of 
economic prosperity. 
Nebraskans understood the twin impulses 
for aid and regulation. As the state struggled to 
protect its livestock industry, it looked to the 
federal government for assistance. Nebraskans 
also expected the federal government to pro-
hibit unfair practices by large businesses. The 
state's leaders supported both of these goals at 
the same time, indicating that aid and regula-
tion were nothing more than different manifes-
tations of the same agenda. 
Nebraskans knew that state agencies were 
not fully capable of aiding and regulating 
nationwide industries. The policies of the Live 
Stock Sanitary Commission and the Board of 
Live Stock Agents often led to disputes with 
other states, and Nebraska consistently called 
for greater federal involvement. These efforts 
contributed to the rise of progressivism, which 
was an effort to help all aspects of society, 
including capitalism, reach their full potential. 
In the Northeast, as well as California, state 
governments formed close ties to corporate 
businesses.93 This kind of relationship could 
not meet all of the livestock industry's needs, 
however, and Nebraska contributed to the 
growth of a progressive system at the national 
level. 
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